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Abstract
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences,
are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mecha-
nisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial
Rule (PS). These two mechanisms both have desirable economic and com-
putational properties, but the outcomes they induce can be incomparable
in many instances, thus creating challenges in deciding which mechanism
to adopt in practice. In this paper we first look at the space of lexico-
graphic preferences and show that, as opposed to the general preference
domain, RSD satisfies envyfreeness. Moreover, we show that although
under lexicographic preferences PS is strategyproof when the number of
objects is less than or equal agents, it is strictly manipulable when there
are more objects than agents. In the space of general preferences, we pro-
vide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS, analyze
economic properties, and provide further insights on the applicability of
each mechanism in different application domains.
1 Introduction
The problem of assigning a number of indivisible objects to a set of agents,
each with a private preference ordering over the objects, in the absence of mon-
etary transfer, is fundamental in many multiagent resource allocation applica-
tions, and has been the center of attention amongst researchers at the interface
of artificial intelligence, economics, and mechanism design. Assigning dormi-
tory rooms or offices to students, students to public schools, college courses to
students, teaching load to faculty, organs and medical resources to patients,
members to subcommittees, etc. are some of the myriad examples of one-sided
matching problems [25, 28, 29, 3, 9, 22].
Two important (randomized) matching mechanisms are Random Serial Dic-
tatorship (RSD) [2] and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS) [6]. Both mechanisms
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have important economic properties and are practical to implement. The RSD
mechanism has strong truthful incentives but guarantees neither efficiency nor
envyfreeness. PS satisfies efficiency and envyfreeness, however, it is susceptible
to manipulation.
Therefore, since both RSD and PS induce random assignments, there are
subtle points to be considered when deciding which mechanism to use. For
example, given a particular preference profile, the mechanisms often produce
random assignments which are simply incomparable and thus, without addi-
tional knowledge of the underlying utility models of the agents, it is difficult
to determine which is the “better” outcome. Furthermore, properties like non-
manipulability and envyfreeness can depend on whether there is underlying
structure in the preferences, and even in general preference models it is valu-
able to understand under what conditions a mechanism is likely to be non-
manipulable or envyfree as this can guide designers choices.
In this paper, we consider the random assignment of m objects to n agents,
where each agent reports her complete preferences as a strict ordering over ob-
jects. We first look at the space of lexicographic preferences and define two
axioms for fairness based on partial preference orderings. We show that, as op-
posed to the general preference domain, RSD satisfies envyfreeness. Moreover,
we show that although under lexicographic preferences PS is strategyproof when
the number of objects is less than or equal agents, it is susceptible to manipu-
lation when there are more objects than agents.
We empirically study the space of all possible preference profiles for various
matching problems, and provide insights on the comparability of RSD and PS
under the various agent-object combinations with the aim of providing practical
insights on the different properties of RSD and PS.
2 Relation to the literature
In the house allocation problem with ordinal preferences, Svensson showed that
serial dictatorship is the only deterministic mechanism that is strategyproof,
nonbossy, and neutral [30]. Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez showed that uniform
randomization over all serial dictatorship assignments, a.k.a RSD, is equivalent
to the top trading cycle’s core from random initial endowment, and thus satisfies
stratgyeproofness, proportionality, and ex post efficiency [2]. Although RSD is
strategyproof and proportionally fair, but it does not guarantee envyfreeness.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin noted the inefficiency of the RSD mechanism from
the ex ante perspective, and characterized random assignment mechanisms
based on first order stochastic dominance (sd) [6]. They further proposed the
probabilistic serial mechanism as an efficient and envyfree mechanism. While PS
is not strategyproof, it satisfies weak stratgyeproofness for problems with equal
number of agents and objects. Kojima studied random assignment of multiple
indivisible objects and showed that PS is strictly manipulable (not weakly strat-
egyproof) even when there are only two agents [18]. Kojima and Manea, later,
considered a setting with multiple copies of each object and showed that in large
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assignment problems with sufficienctly many copies of each object, truthtelling
is a weakly dominant strategy in PS [19]. In order to give a rationale for practi-
cal employment of RSD and PS in real-life applications, Che and Kojima further
analyzed the economic properties of PS and RSD in large markets with multiple
copies of each object and concluded that these mechanisms become equivalent
when the market size becomes large [10]. Particularly, they showed that ineffi-
ciency of RSD and manipulability of PS vanishes when the number of copies of
each object approaches infinity.
The practical implications of deploying RSD and PS have been the center
of attention in many one-sided matching problems [1]. In the school choice
setting with multi-capacity alternatives, Pathak compared RSD and PS using
data from the assignment of public schools in New York City and observed that
many students obtained a more desirable random assignment through PS [24].
However, the efficiency difference was quite small. These observations further
confirm Che and Kojima’s equivalence result when there are multiple copies of
each object (i.e. school seats) available [10]. Despite these findings for arbitrary
large markets, the equivalence results of Che and Kojima, and its extension to
all random mechanisms by Liu and Pycia [20], do not hold when the quantities
of each object is limited to one [10].
This paper sets out to study the comparability of PS and RSD when there is
only one copy of each object, and analyze the space of all preference profiles for
different numbers of agents and objects. We make several intriguing observa-
tions about the manipulability of PS and fairness properties of RSD. Following
Manea’s work on asymptotic inefficiency of RSD [21], we show that despite this
inefficiency result, the fraction of random assignments at which PS stochasti-
cally dominates RSD vanishes when the number of agents is less than or equal
to the available objects. Moreover, we show that this result strongly holds for
lexicographic preferences when there is equal number of agents and objects.
3 Formal Representation
A one-sided matching problem 〈N,M,〉 consists of a set of agents N , where
|N | = n, a set of distinct indivisible objects M with |M | = m, and a preference
profile  denoting the set of strict and complete preference orderings of agents
over the objects. Let P denote the set of all complete and strict preferences over
M . Each agent i has a private preference ordering denoted by i∈ P, where
a i b indicates that agent i prefers object a over b. Thus, a preference profile
is = (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn. We represent the preference ordering of agent i by
the ordered list of objects i= a i b i c or i= (abc), for short.
A random assignment is a stochastic n × m matrix A that specifies the
probability of assigning each object j to each agent i. The probability vector
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Ai = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,m) denotes the random allocation of agent i, that is,
A =

A1
A2
...
An
 =

A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,m
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,m
...
...
. . .
...
An,1 An,2 . . . An,m

Let A refer to the set of possible assignments. An assignment A ∈ A is said
to be feasible if and only if ∀i ∈ N,∑j∈M Ai,j = 1, that is, the probability
distribution function is valid for each object.
Given random assignment Ai, the probability that agent i is assigned an
object that is at least as good as object ` is defined as follows
w(i, `, Ai) =
∑
j∈M :ji`
Ai,j (1)
A deterministic assignment is simply a binary matrix of degenerate lotteries
over objects that allocates each object to exactly one agent with certainty. Every
random assignments is a convex combination of deterministic assignments and
is induced by a lottery over deterministic assignments [31].
A matching mechanism is a mapping M : Pn → A from the set of possible
preference profiles to the set of random assignments.
3.1 Properties
In this section we define key properties that matching mechanisms should have.
In particular, we formally define efficiency, strategyproofness and envyfreeness
for (randomized) matching mechanisms.
In the context of deterministic assignments, an assignment Ai Pareto dom-
inates another assignment Bi at  if ∃i ∈ N such that Ai i Bi and ∀k ∈ N
Ak k Bk, where Ai i Bi denotes that agent i strictly prefers assignment Ai
over Bi. An assignment is Pareto efficient at  if no other assignment exists
that Pareto dominates it at . Extending the Pareto efficiency requirement
to random mechanisms, we focus only on mechanisms that always guarantee a
Pareto efficient solution ex post. A random assignment is called ex post efficient
if it can be represented as a probability distribution over deterministic Pareto
efficient assignments.
To evaluate the quality of a random assignment, we follow the convention
proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin based on first-order stochastic domi-
nance [6].
Definition 1. Given a preference ordering i, random assignment Ai stochas-
tically dominates (sd) assignment Bi(6= Ai) if
∀` ∈M, w(i, `, Ai) ≥ w(i, `, Bi) (2)
Stochastic dominance is a strong requirement. It implies that for the entire
space of utility functions that is consistent with ordinal preferences, an agent’s
expected utility under A is always greater than her expected utility under B.
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Definition 2. A random assignment is sd-efficient if for all agents, it is not
stochastically dominated by any other random assignment.
A matching mechanism is sd-efficient if at all preference profiles ∈ Pn, for
all agents i ∈ N , the induced random assignment is not stochastically dominated
by any other assignment. Intuitively, no other mechanism exists that all agents
strictly prefer its outcome to their current random assignments.
A matching mechanism is sd -strategyproof if there exists no non-truthful
preference ordering ′i 6=i that improves agent i’s random assignment. More
formally,
Definition 3. Mechanism M is sd-strategyproof if at all preference profiles
∈ Pn, for all agents i ∈ N , and for any misreport ′i∈ Pn, such that A =
M() and A′ =M(′i,−i), we have:
∀` ∈M, w(i, `, Ai) ≥ w(i, `, A′i) (3)
In the context of random mechanisms, sd -strategyproofness is a strict re-
quirement. It states that under any utility model consistent with the preference
orderings, no agent can improve her expected outcome by misreporting.
We can also define a milder version of strategyproofness. A mechanism is
weakly sd-strategyproof if at all preference profiles, no agent can misreport her
preferences and obtain a random assignment that strictly improves her assign-
ment for the entire space of utility models consistent with her true preference
ordering.
Definition 4. Mechanism M is weakly sd-strategyproof if for all preference
profiles ∈ Pn, for any agent i with misreport ′i, where A = M() and
A′ =M(′i,−i), we have
∃` ∈M,w(i, `, Ai) > w(i, `, A′i) (4)
We say that a random assignment induced by mechanismM is manipulable
if it is not sd -strategyproof. That is, there exists an agent i with preference i
that her assignment under a truthful report does not stochastically dominate
her assignment under a non-truthful report. Formally, assignment A induced by
mechanism M is manipulable at preference profile  if there exists an agent
i ∈ N with misreport ′i such that if A = M() and A′ = M(′i,−i), we
have ∃` ∈M, w(i, `, A′i) > w(i, `, Ai).
Intuitively, an assignment is manipulable if for some utility function con-
sistent with the ordinal preferences, an agent’s expected utility under a non-
truthful report improves.
An assignment induced by a matching mechanism is strictly manipulable
if the mechanism does not satisfy weak sd -strategyproofness, i.e., the induced
corresponding random assignment is sd -manipulable. Thus, assignment A in-
duced by mechanism M is sd-manipulable at preference profile  if there
exists an agent i ∈ N with preference i, and a misreport ′i∈ Pn such that
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A′i =M(′i,−i) stochastically dominates Ai =M(), that is, ∀` ∈M, w(i
, `, A′i) ≥ w(i, `, Ai).
An sd -manipulable assignment indicates that there exists an agent that can
strictly benefit from misreporting. Clearly, a weakly sd -strategyproof assign-
ment is not sd -manipulable.
To analyze the fairness properties of matching mechanisms, we study the or-
dinal notion of envyfreeness. An assignment is sd -envyfree if each agent strictly
prefers her random allocation to any other agent’s assignment, that is, given i
agent i’s random assignment stochastically dominates any other agent’s assign-
ment.
Definition 5. Given agent i’s preference i, assignment Ai is sd-envyfree if
for all agents ∀k 6= i ∈ N ,
∀` ∈M, w(i, `, Ai) ≥ w(i, `, Ak) (5)
A matching mechanism satisfies sd -envyfreeness if at all preference profiles
∈ Pn, it induces sd -envyfree assignments for all agents.
An assignment is weakly sd-envyfree if no agent strictly prefers another
agent’s random assignment to her own. Formally, for all agents i, k ∈ N with
Ai 6= Ak, we have ∃` ∈M, w(i, `, Ai) > w(i, `, Ak).
4 Two Random Mechanisms
In this section, we formally introduce two widely studied matching mechanisms,
Random Serial Dictatorship [2] and Probabilistic Serial rule [6].
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is a uniform distribution over all possible
(priority) orderings of agents, and for each realization of the orderings, the
first agent receives her most preferred object, the next agent receives her most
preferred object among the set of remaining objects, and so on until no object
remains unassigned.1
Definition 6. Given a preference profile, the Random Serial Dictatorship
(RSD) mechanism is a uniform distribution over the assignments induced by
the set of all possible priority orderings over agents.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez showed the equivalence of the random serial
dictatorship and the core from the random endowment in the house allocation
problem, and argued that this equivalence justifies the wide use of the RSD
mechanism in many practical applications such as student housing, course allo-
cating, etc. [2].
Bogmolnaia and Moulin proposed the Probabilistic Serial rule (PS) [6].
Given a preference profile, the PS mechanism treats objects as a set of divisible
1For n < m, RSD requires a careful method for picking sequence at each realized priority
ordering, which will directly affect the efficiency and envy properties of the assignments [8, 17].
For simplicity, we assume that when n < m, at each priority ordering the first agent chooses
(m− n+ 1) objects, and the rest of the agents choose one object each.
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objects and simulates a Simultaneous Eating Algorithm (SEA): At every point
in time, each agent starts eating from her top choice according to i at the unit
speed. When an object is completely exhausted (eaten away), each agent eats
away from her most preferred objects among the remaining objects. The eating
algorithm terminates when all objects are exhausted.
The random assignment of agent i, when SEA terminates, is the fraction
of each object that has been eaten away by agent i. We adopt the following
definition from Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]:
Definition 7. Given a preference profile, the Probabilistic Serial rule (PS)
is the random probability assignment by simulating the Simultaneous Eating
Algorithm with uniform speed.
For a given preference profile , we let PS() ∈ A and RSD() ∈ A denote
the outcomes of PS and RSD mechanisms respectively.
In their seminal work, Bogomolnaia and Moulin characterized the economic
properties of these two mechanisms and showed that RSD does not guarantee
sd -efficiency [6]. The following example, adopted from Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001), illustrates the inefficiency of the RSD mechanism.
Example 1. Suppose there are four agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four objects
M = {a, b, c, d}. Consider the following preference profile = ((abcd), (abcd), (badc), (badc)).
a b c d
A1 1/2 0 1/2 0
A2 1/2 0 1/2 0
A3 0 1/2 0 1/2
A4 0 1/2 0 1/2
(a) Assignment under PS()
a b c d
A1 5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
A2 5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
A3 1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
A4 1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
(b) Assignment under RSD()
Table 1: Example showing the inefficiency of RSD
In this example, all agents strictly prefer the assignment induced by PS over
the RSD assignment. Thus, RSD is inefficient at this preference profile.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical results from the literature for both RSD
and PS. For n ≥ m, PS satisfies sd -efficiency, sd -envyfreeness, and weakly sd -
strategyproofness, while RSD is sd -strategyproof, and weakly sd -envyfree, but it
is not sd -efficient nor sd -envyfree [6]. However, for n < m, PS is sd -manipulable,
i.e., PS is not even weakly sd -strategyproof [19].
4.1 The Incomparability of RSD and PS
The theoretical properties of RSD and PS do not provide proper insight into
the head-to-head comparison and applicability of these two mechanisms.
RSD does not guarantee sd -efficiency, meaning that the assignments induced
by RSD are not equivalent to the sd -efficient assignments induced by PS. How-
ever, in many instances of preference profiles the random assignments induced
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n ≥ m n < m
PS RSD PS RSD
sd-strategyproof weak 3 7 3
sd-efficiency 3 7 3 7
sd-envyfree 3 weak 3 weak
Table 2: The summary of properties
a b c
A1 1/2 0 1/2
A2 1/2 1/4 1/4
A3 0 3/4 1/4
(a) Assignment under PS()
a b c
A1 1/2 0 1/2
A2 1/2 1/6 1/3
A3 0 5/6 1/6
(b) Assignment under RSD()
Table 3: Incomparability of RSD and PS
by PS and RSD are simply incomparable, in that neither assignment stochas-
tically dominates the other one. The following example illustrates this subtle
distinction even for n = m = 3.
Example 2. Suppose there are three agents N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects
M = {a, b, c}. Consider the following preference profile = ((acb), (abc), (bac)).
As shown in Table 3, neither mechanism provides an assignment that stochas-
tically dominates the other: agent 1 receives the same allocation under both RSD
and PS, agent 2 strictly prefers PS over RSD, and agent 3 strictly prefers RSD
over PS. Thus, the two assignments are incomparable in terms of sd-efficiency.
In such instances, the efficiency of the assignments is ambiguous with respect
to ordinal preferences. Thus, the (ex ante) efficiency of the induced assignments
is contingent on the underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility func-
tions.
Similarly, the envy of RSD and the manipulability of PS depend on the
structure of preference profiles, and thus, a compelling question, that justifies
the practical implications of deploying a matching mechanism, is to analyze the
space of preference profiles to find the likelihood of inefficient, manipulable, or
envious assignments under these mechanisms.
In the next sections, we focus attention on lexicographic preference, and
discuss the properties of RSD and PS in this domain. Then, we empirically
study the space of all preference profiles for various matching problems.
5 Lexicographic Preferences
In many real-life scenarios, players have preferences that are lexicographic on al-
ternatives or objects, for example political negotiations, voting problems, team
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standings in sports like Hockey, sequential screening process for hiring candi-
dates or choosing alternatives, etc. [14, 32, 13]. Lexicographic preferences are
present in various applications and have been extensively studied in artificial
intelligence and multiagent systems as a means of assessing allocations based
on ordinal preferences [11, 26].
Given two assignments, an agent prefers the one in which there is a higher
probability for getting the most-preferred object. Formally, given a preference
ordering i= o1  o2 . . .  om, agent i prefers any allocation Ai that assigns a
higher probability to her top ranked object pi,o1 over any assignment Bi with
Bi,o1 < Ai,o1 , regardless of the assigned probabilities to all other objects. Only
when two assignments allocate the same probability to the top object will the
agent considers the next-ranked object.
Definition 8. Given agent i’s preference ordering i, assignment Ai lexico-
graphically dominates (ld) assignment Bi if
∃ ` ∈M : Ai,` > Bi,` ∧ ∀j i ` : Ai,j = Bi,j . (6)
A matching mechanism is lexicographically efficient (ld-efficient) if for all
preference profiles its induced assignment is not lexicographically dominated by
any other random assignment. By definition sd -efficiency yields ld -efficiency,
however, an ld -efficient assignment may not be sd -efficient. The following ex-
ample illustrates this:
Example 3. Consider four agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four objects M =
{a, b, c, d} at the following preference profile = ((cabd), (acdb), (cbda), (acbd)).
Table 4 shows the assignments induced by PS and RSD. Here, PS lexicograph-
ically dominates RSD since all the agents receive a higher probability of their
more preferred objects under PS. However, PS does not stochastically dominate
RSD because agent 2 (similarly agent 4) weakly prefers the RSD assignment as
w(2, c, RSD()) = 1124 + 112 = 1324 is greater than w(2, c, PS()) = 12 +0 = 12 .
Thus, the two random assignments are in fact incomparable with respect to
stochastic dominance.
Proposition 1. PS is ld-efficient, RSD is not.
Proof. The ld -efficiency of PS is directly derived from its sd -efficiency. Example
1 illustrates that RSD is not ld -efficient.
a b c d
A1 0 1/3 1/2 1/6
A2 1/2 0 0 1/2
A3 0 1/3 1/2 1/6
A4 1/2 1/3 0 1/6
(a) PS() assignment
a b c d
A1 1/12 1/3 5/12 1/6
A2 11/24 0 1/12 11/24
A3 0 5/12 5/12 1/6
A4 11/24 1/4 1/12 5/24
(b) RSD() assignment
Table 4: An example showing PS dominating RSD lexicographically but not
w.r.t stochastic dominance.
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Sd -efficiency implies ld -efficiency. However, similar to stochastic dominance
relations, in terms of matching mechanisms it is unclear whether PS or RSD are
comparable in terms of ld -efficiency, in particular at those instances of preference
profiles that they are non-comparable under stochastic dominance.
5.1 Envyfreeness
In many practical situations, such as political negotiations, hiring candidates,
and sports standings [14, 13], players most often associate higher regard to
their top choices, and assess the fairness of random outcomes according to ld -
envyfreeness.
Definition 9. Given agent i’s preference i, assignment Ai is ld-envyfree if
there exists no agent-object pair k ∈ N, ` ∈ M such that, Ak,` > Ai,` ∧ ∀j i
` : Ai,j = Ak,j.
A matching mechanism satisfies ld -envyfreeness if at all preference pro-
files ∈ Pn it induces ld -envyfree assignments for all agents. Sd -envyfreeness
leads to ld -envyfreeness; however, ld -envyfree allocations may not satisfy sd -
envyfreeness.
Example 4. In Example 2, under RSD no agent is ld-envious of any other
agent. However, agent 2 is weakly envious of agent 3’s assignment. Thus,
the assignment is not sd-envyfree. Assume agent 2’s utility for the objects is
u2(a) > u2(b) > u2(c). Agent 2’s utility for objects as good as object b under
her assignment and agent 3’s assignment can be written as follows 56u2(b) >
3
6u2(a) +
1
6u2(b). Thus, for all utility functions at which u2(b) >
3
4u2(a), agent
2 prefers agent 3’s random assignment.
Based on the definition of stochastic dominance, it is easy to see that every
sd -envyfree mechanism satisfies ld -envyfreeness. PS satisfies sd -envyfreeness,
hence, it is ld -envyfree for all preference profiles. However, ld -envyfreeness is
stronger than weak sd -envyfreeness.
Proposition 2. Every ld-envyfree allocation is weakly sd-envyfree, that is, ld-
envyfree ⊂ weakly sd-envyfree.
The inclusion in Proposition 2 is strict: consider two agents with 1=2=
(abc). The random assignments A1 = (
1
6 ,
5
6 , 0) and A2 = (
4
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ) are weakly
sd -envyfree, but do not satisfy ld -envyfreeness. The relationship between the
different definitions of fairness is as follows:2
Before analyzing the envyfreeness of RSD in the lexicographic domain, we
need to define a simple axiom called downward partial symmetry (DPS). In-
tuitively, DPS is an extension to the fairness notion of equity (a.k.a propor-
tionality). DPS states that starting from the first-ranked objects downwards,
all agents with identical partial preferences receive exactly the same random
assignment of the objects in the partial ordering.
2For a complete discussion on the computational complexity of finding or verifying the
fairness concepts with respect to envyfreeness and proportionality see [4].
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sd -envyfreeweak sd -envyfree
strongerweaker
ld -envyfree ex post envyfree
Definition 10. Let `i denote the partial preference of agent i, such that `i=
o1 i . . . i o`. A random assignment satisfies downward partial symmetry
(DPS) if for all agent i, k ∈ N ,
∀` where `i=`k ⇔ for all j i `, Ai,j = Ak,j (7)
Similarly, a random assignment satisfies upward partial symmetry (UPS)
if starting from the least favorite objects, agents with identical partial prefer-
ences receive exactly the same random assignment of the objects in the partial
ordering. It is easy to see that PS satisfies both UPS and DPS. However, RSD
only satisfies DPS.
Proposition 3. RSD satisfies DPS but does not guarantee UPS.
Proof. In Example 3, agent 1 and 4’s assignments illustrate the non-existence
of UPS.
RSD is a uniform distribution over the set of priority orderings, and thus,
satisfies equal treatment of equals for full preference orderings, i.e., i=k then
Ai,` = Ak,`,∀`. Assume for contradiction that for two agents i, k ∈ N where
`i=`k, ∃ `′ i ` such that Ai,`′ 6= Ak,`′ . For the sake of simplicity, let us assume
Ai,`′ < Ak,`′ . For any serial dictatorship where i precedes k in the priority
ordering, i chooses an object j such that j i `′. This immediately implies that
Ai,j > Ak,j for some j k `′. We can continue this by induction backward up
to the first-ranked item, implying that there exists a priority ordering at which
agent i chooses a less preferred object, that is `i 6=`k, which contradicts the
assumption. Similarly we can show that if `i 6=`k, it is impossible to achieve
Ai,j = Ak,j ,∀j i `.
The next theorem shows that although RSD is not sd -envyfree, it satisfies
the weaker notion of ld -envyfreeness.
Theorem 1. RSD is ld-envyfree, for any n and m.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an agent k ∈ N with random
assignment Ak that agent i ld prefers Ak to her own Ai. Therefore, by definition
of lexicographic dominance, there exists an object ` ∈M such that RSD assigns
higher probability to k, i.e. Ai,` < Ak,`, and ∀j ∈ M : j i `, Ai,j = Ak,j .
According to Proposition 3 this is only possible when `i 6=`k, implying that
RSD is ld -envyfree.
The ld -envyfreeness of RSD is noteworthy: it shows that despite RSD is not
sd -envyfree, it satisfies envyfreeness with respect to lexicographic preferences.
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5.2 Strategyproofness
When multiple objects can be allocated to each agent, manipulating the PS
outcome may result in a stochastically dominant assignment. In fact, even for
n = 2, the random assignment induced PS is sd -efficient and sd -envyfree but
not weakly sd -strategyproof (i.e. sd -manipulable) [18].
Example 5. Consider two agents and four objects with preferences = ((abcd), (bcad)).
Assume that agent 1 misreports her preference as ′1= (bacd).
a b c d
A1 1 0 1/2 1/2
A2 0 1 1/2 1/2
(a) PS(1,2) assignment
a b c d
A1 1 1/2 0 1/2
A2 0 1/2 1 1/2
(b) PS(′1,2) assignment
Table 5: Random assignments under (a) truthful and (b) non-truthful reports.
Agent 1’s allocation under the misreport stochastically dominates her assign-
ment when reporting truthfully because for all objects `, w(1, `, PS(′1,2)) ≥
w(1, `, PS(1,2)).
The main intuition for the strong manipulablity of PS comes from the eating
sequence of agents. Since agents can be allocated more than one object, the
sequence in which agents choose to eat away the objects becomes crucial (for a
discussion on the game-theoretic properties and complexity of manipulation in
picking sequences see [17, 8, 7]).
It is apparent that sd -manipulablity leads to ld -manipulatiy, however, there
are random assignments under PS that are ld -manipulable but not sd -manipulable,
as demonstrated by the following inclusion relation: sd -manipulable ⊂ ld -
manipulable ⊂ manipulable.
In the domain of divisible objects, PS is the only stochastic mechanism which
is sd -efficient, sd -envyfree, and ld -strategyproof on the lexicographic preference
domain [27]. However, this characterization is only valid for n ≥ m.
Proposition 4. For n < m, PS is not ld-strategyproof nor sd-strategyproof.
Proof. Proof follows from Example 5.
Ld -strategyproofness is the direct consequence of a simple axiom called
bounded invariance property [5], that is, no agent is able to change her pref-
erence order for any object she likes less than j such that her (probabilistic)
allocation of j improves. This axiom was first characterized by Bogomolnaia
and Heo, where they showed that PS satisfies bounded invariance for n = m [5].
However, since for n < m each agent has an eating capacity of more than 1, PS
no longer satisfies the bounded invariance property.
Proposition 5. For n < m, PS does not satisfy the bounded invariance prop-
erty.
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6 Experimental Results
The theoretical properties of PS and RSD, even in restricted domains such
as lexicographic preferences, only provide limited insight into their practical
applications. In particular, when deciding which mechanism to use in different
settings, the incomparability of PS and RSD leaves us with an ambiguous choice.
Thus, we examine the properties of RSD and PS in the space of all possible
preference profiles.
The number of all possible preference profiles is super exponential (m!)n.
Thus, for each combination of n agents and m objects we considered 1,000
randomly generated instances by sampling from a uniform preference profile
distribution. Thus, each data point is the average of 1,000 replications. For
each preference profile, we ran both PS and RSD mechanisms and compared
their outcomes (in terms of random assignments).
A preliminary look at our empirical results illustrates the followings: when
m ≤ 2, n ≤ 3, PS coincides exactly with RSD, which results in the best of the
two mechanisms, i.e., both mechanisms are sd -efficient, sd -strategyproof, and
sd -envyfree.3 Moreover, when m = 2, for all n PS is sd -strategyproof (although
the PS assignments are not necessarily equivalent to assignments induced by
RSD), RSD is sd -envyfree, and for most instances PS stochastically dominates
RSD, particularly when n ≥ 4.
6.1 Efficiency
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Figure 1: The fraction of preference profiles under which PS is superior to RSD.
Our first finding is that the fraction of preference profiles at which RSD and
PS induce equivalent random assignments goes to 0 when n grows. There are two
conclusions that one can draw from this observation. First, this result confirms
the theoretical results of Manea on asymptotic inefficiency of RSD [21], in that,
3This was first noted by Bogomolnaia and Moulin for n = m = 2 [6].
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in most instances, the assignments induced by RSD are not equivalent to the
PS assignments. Second, this result also suggests that the incomparability of
outcomes is significant, that is, the (ex ante) efficiency of the random outcomes
is highly dependent on the underlying utility models. We propose the following
conjecture.
Conjecture 1. The fraction of preference profiles ∈ Pn for which RSD is
stochastically dominated by PS at  converges to zero as nm → 1.
Our empirical results support Conjecture 1 on comparability of RSD and PS.
Figure 1a shows that although RSD is inefficient when n grows beyond n > 5,
due to incomparability of RSD and PS with regard to stochastic dominance
relation, the RSD induced assignments are not stochastically dominated by sd -
efficient assignments induced by PS.
We also see similar results when we restrict ourselves to lexicographic pref-
erences (Figure 1b).
Conjecture 2. The fraction of preference profiles ∈ Pn for which RSD is
lexicographically dominated by PS at  converges to zero as nm → 1.
For lexicographic preferences, we also observe that the fraction of preference
profiles for which PS assignments strictly dominate RSD-induced allocations
goes to 1 when the number of agents and objects diverge.
Conjecture 3. The fraction of preference profiles ∈ Pn for which RSD is
lexicographically dominated by PS at  converges to 1 as |n−m| grows.
One immediate conclusion is that although RSD does not guarantee either
sd -efficiency or ld -efficiency, in most settings with n ≤ m, especially when
n = m, neither of the two mechanisms is preferred in terms of efficiency. Hence,
one cannot simply rule out the RSD mechanism.
6.2 Envy in RSD
In our next experiment we measure the fraction of agents that are weakly envious
of at least one another agent. Each data point represents the fraction of (weakly)
envious agents.
Figure 2 shows that for RSD, the percentage of agents that are weakly en-
vious increases with the number of agents. Figure 2a reveals an interesting
observation: fixing any n > 3, the percentage of agents that are (weakly) envi-
ous grows with the number of objects, however, there is a sudden drop in the
percentage of envious agents when there are equal number of agents and objects.
For better understanding of the population of agents who feel (weakly) en-
vious under RSD, we illustrate the envy distribution over the set of preference
profiles for each n = m (Figure 2b). One observation is that there are few dis-
tinct envy profiles at each n, each representing a particular class of preference
profiles, and by increasing n, the fraction of agents that are envious of at least
one other agent increases.
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Figure 2: Plots representing the percentage of (weakly) envious agents under
RSD.
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ence profiles under PS.
Figure 3: Heatmaps illustrating the manipulablity of PS.
6.3 Manipulability of PS
In Section 5, we characterized the incentive properties of the PS mechanism
with regards to the stochastic dominance and lexicographic dominance rela-
tions, arguing that although for n ≥ m PS is weakly sd -strategyproof and
ld -strategyproof, when n < m PS no longer satisfies these two properties.4
Nonetheless, we are interested in gaining insights on the fraction of preference
profiles at which PS is manipulable.
4A recent experimental study on the incentive properties of PS shows that human sub-
jects are less likely to manipulate the mechanism when misreporting is a Nash equilibrium.
However, subjects’ tendency for misreporting is still significant even when it does not im-
prove their allocations [16]. Hence, the PS mechanism suffers from incentive properties. In
fact other mechanisms, such as the Draft mechanism, has shown to be highly susceptible to
manipulation in many real-life markets such as course allocation at business schools [9].
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Figure 4: The fraction of ld -manipulable profiles under PS.
Figure 3a shows that the fraction of manipulable preference profiles goes to
1 as n or m grow. In fact, PS is almost 100% manipulable for n > 5,m > 5
(obviously PS is sd -strategyproof when m = 2.). Another compelling obser-
vation is that for all n < m, the fraction of sd -manipulable preference profiles
goes to 1 as m − n grows (Figure 3b). This states that in problems where the
number of objects are larger than the number of agents, an agent can strictly
benefit from misreporting her preferences. Figure 4 shows that under lexico-
graphic preferences, the fraction of ld -manipulable preference profiles converges
to 1 even more rapidly.
7 Discussion
In this paper we conducted a comparison study of RSD and PS in order to gain
further insight into their respective properties. We argued that outcomes gener-
ated by the mechanisms can be incomparable, making it difficult to determine
which is the better mechanism in different settings. We then looked at some the-
oretical properties for the mechanisms under the assumption that agents have
lexicographic preferences. Finally, we conducted an empirical comparison on
the mechanisms.
Earlier work had shown that RSD is sd -strategyproof, ex post efficient and
guarantees weak sd -envyfreeness. We were able to further the theoretical un-
derstanding of the mechanism by showing that it is also ld -envyfree. Further-
more, our empirical work showed that the actual fraction of outcomes where PS
stochastically dominates RSD goes to 0 as nm goes to 1, raising the question as
to whether the lack of sd -efficiency guarantees for RSD is a significant concern
in practice. In contrast, PS is sd -efficient, sd -envyfree and ld -strategyproof
for n ≥ m. However, when n < m, the fraction of sd - and ld -manipulable
assignments approaches 1, limiting the effectiveness of PS.
Given the theoretical and empirical results, we suggest that in many cases
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a b c
A1 1/3 1/2 1/6
A2 1/3 0 2/3
A3 1/3 1/2 1/6
Table 6: Assignment under PS() = RSD()
RSD is, perhaps, a more suitable matching mechanism to consider, especially
when n ≤ m. This confirms previous studies on settings where there was an
equal number of agents and objects [23, 12, 15]. We further strengthen this
argument by providing an observation: At preference profiles where PS and
RSD induce identical assignments, RSD is sd -efficient, sd -envyfree, and sd -
strategyproof. However, PS may still be manipulable.
Example 6. Consider the following preference profile = ((bca), (cab), (bca)).
Table 6 shows the induced random assignment. In this case, with PS as the
matching mechanism, agent 1 can misreport her preference as ′1= (cba), and
manipulate her assignment to 1/4(b), 1/2(c), 1/4(a). It is easy to see that agent
1’s misreport improves her expected outcome for all utility models where 26u1(c) >
1
4u1(b) +
1
12u1(a) (for example utilities 10, 9, 0 for b, c, a respectively.).
This work raises several interesting questions. From the theoretical perspec-
tive, among these open problems, providing theoretical proofs for the efficiency
relations in Conjectures 1, 2, and 3 is crucial and not trivial. From the practi-
cal view, an interesting open problem is to see if there exists any randomized
ld -efficient mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness and some notion of fair-
ness (such as proportionality) for n < m. Lastly, it would be interesting to
investigate if there is an extension to the PS mechanism (or its variant based on
different eating speeds) that is potentially weakly sd -strategyproof for assigning
multiple objects to each agent for n < m.
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